- By Nikolas Kozloff, D.Phil
- 28 March 2005
• U.S. – Venezuela
bad blood
• More bark than bite as Chavez holds out his hand to Washington.
• Advent of petro-diplomacy hits South America
• Venezuela and U.S. fated to remain connected
Over the past few weeks there
have been some signs that Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez has backed down
from his earlier confrontational posture towards Washington. According to
the Venezuelan foreign minister, Chavez has no intention of reducing oil
exports to the United States. The economic importance of oil in terms of
Venezuelan-U.S. relations cannot be overstated. Venezuela is the fifth
largest oil exporter in the world and the fourth largest supplier of oil to
the United States after Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia. Last year,
Venezuela’s state owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (Pdvsa)
accounted for 11.8% (1.52-million barrels a day) of U.S. imports.
Tensions have been bristling between the two nations ever since April 2002
when Chavez, the democratically elected president, was briefly removed from
power in a coup. Chavez, a firebrand politician and former paratrooper,
accused (not without merit) Washington of sponsoring the attempted overthrow
as well as supporting a devastating oil lockout in 2002-3. Never one to
soften his language, Chavez bluntly referred to U.S. president George Bush
with an expletive and the United States as “an imperialist power.” What is
more, according to Chavez, Bush had plans to see him assassinated. In a
further barb, Chavez declared that if he were killed the United States could
“forget Venezuelan oil."
For a time it seemed that their bilateral relations could sink no lower.
Though there are many reasons for the deterioration in relations (including
Chavez's ties with Washington’s anathema, Cuban President Fidel Castro, the
Venezuelan president’s criticism of U.S.-led efforts for a free trade zone
in the Americas and Chavez’s opposition to the war in Iraq) oil was surely
of paramount importance. When he took office in 1998 Chavez launched a
reform of Venezuela's oil policy, seeking to reestablish a predominant role
for the presidency in the design and implementation of an oil strategy
through the Ministry of Energy and Mining. This move challenged vested
interests in Pdvsa, a powerful, almost autonomous, company with total assets
estimated at $100 billion. The company’s executives, who earned between
$100,000 and $4,000,000 a year, had grown accustomed to taking the lead in
defining the oil policy of their virtual fiefdom. While Chavez did not deny
the role of the private sector in the oil industry, his reform process aimed
at curbing the trend toward the privatization of Pdvsa. On the international
front, Chavez worked to achieve a higher price for oil through OPEC, the oil
cartel of which Venezuela
was a founding member. He also worked to increase the profile and power of
OPEC world wide. Chavez additionally sought to guarantee that the state
collected a greater share of oil revenues. He imposed royalties on oil
output which was applied on foreign producers operating in the country,
chief among them U.S. giant Exxon-Mobil. Last year, Venezuela raised royalty
taxes on heavy crude projects in the Orinoco
oil belt from 1% to 16.6%. Irate Exxon-Mobil representatives say that the
company is paying the new rate "under protest."
PDVSA Serves the
Nation
Keeping Pdvsa under firm government control was politically important. In
recent years, Chavez has sought to utilize oil revenue to carry out an
ambitious social agenda. In a recent study it was estimated that over 60
percent of Venezuela's 24-million people live in poverty and make less than
$2 a day. Accordingly, as a result of record high oil revenues, Chavez has
been able to carry out an impressive array of programs promoting literacy,
job training, land reform, subsidized food, and small loans. Perhaps most
ambitiously, Chavez has used the nation’s oil wealth to extend health care
and import Cuban doctors.
As Chavez began to export cheap subsidized oil to Cuba, Fidel Castro sent
over 13,000 doctors to Venezuela. Today, the doctors are spread throughout
the Andean nation and have access to over half the population, a first in
Venezuela’s history. Chavez’s move to bring in Cuban doctors was one of many
factors regarding his rule that provoked Washington. In May 2004, the U.S.
State Department’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba—the
administration’s propaganda office on Cuban issues—issued a report stating
that Venezuelan oil shipments to Cuba needed to be halted if political
change on the island was to occur – which was tantamount to calling for a de
facto embargo against the Castro regime.
Are there any signs that the confrontation between the two antagonist
nations will soon abate? Recently, Chavez has publicly stated that he wanted
to mend relations with the United States. "We want to continue to send 1.5
million barrels of oil to the United States on a daily basis and to continue
doing business,” he said. What is more, Chavez added that although "we have
said things, sometimes, very harsh things, it has been in response to
aggressions." Chavez explained that, "what I have said is that if it occurs
to the United States, or to someone there, to invade us, that they can
forget about Venezuelan oil." He clarified that this is just "a theory that
we of course do not want, and I hope that the United States does not want it
either."
Chavez turns on the
Charm
Chavez’s recent conciliatory statements have brought little slack from
Washington as the Bush administration’s harsh anti-Chavez rhetoric continues
to boil over whether its splenetic utterances coming from Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld or routinely from the
White House and State Department press offices. On one level, Venezuelan
imbroglio seems to be heading towards deeper water. Chavez has repeatedly
stated his determination to reduce his country’s dependency on oil sales to
the United States. Accordingly, he has begun exploring the sale of parts of
Citgo, Pdvsa’s marketing and refining affiliate in the U.S. Citgo owns eight
refineries and almost 14,000 gas stations located primarily in the eastern
part of the country. Chavez has complained that Citgo, whose refineries are
especially adapted to process heavy crude oil from Venezuela, sells oil to
the U.S at a discount of two dollars a barrel. “We are subsidizing the U.S.
budget,” griped Chavez, who says Citgo contracts were signed before he
assumed office in 1999. According to Citgo's 2004 financial reports, the
company paid $400 million in dividends to Venezuela but paid almost as much
in U.S. taxes. Energy Minister Rafael Ramírez, who also serves as Pdvsa’s
president, has announced a freeze on plans to expand Citgo. Meanwhile,
though Citgo CEO Félix Rodríguez notes that” the government does not plan to
sell off the company's assets,” specialists suggest that Chavez may very
well consider such a move after evaluating the profitability of each
refinery. Alberto Quirós, a former executive at Royal/Dutch Shell in
Venezuela, commented that selling the refineries would not be a bad idea
right now. Chavez, he says, could get a decent price for the refineries
because oil prices and demand are high. Were such facilities to be sold,
however, the process would probably take at least a few years to be
finalized.
Caracas Looks to
Asia
In order to diversify the Venezuelan market for oil, Chavez made plans to
begin shipping Venezuelan crude to China, the world's second-largest energy
consumer after the United States. ”Reaching China is a strategic question,”
says Ramirez. “It would be a mistake not to have a presence there. They are
switching over from coal to more efficient fuels.” In Beijing last December,
Chavez remarked ”We have reached agreements with China to begin to exploit
15 mature oilfields in eastern Venezuela that have more than one billion
barrels in reserves, and a large part of that oil will come to China.” What
is more, Chavez stated that Venezuela wanted to become a "secure, long-term"
petroleum supplier to India and this month the two countries concluded an
energy cooperation agreement. Transporting oil to Asia, however, could prove
logistically difficult. Pdvsa has expressed interest in moving oil across
Panama to the Pacific Ocean via pipeline. The company is also exploring the
idea of building such a facility across Venezuela’s northern border with
Colombia, extending to that country’s Pacific coast. Shipping oil to Asia
carries other logistical and infrastructural problems. China presently has
an insufficient deep conversion refining capacity and transporting petroleum
to the Asian giant would be costly due to the long distances involved.
Moreover, the Panama pipeline eyed by Chavez already transports 100,000
barrels a day of Ecuadorian crude from the Pacific to the Atlantic.
According to analysts, there is no way that the pipeline can be converted
into being able to simultaneously ship Venezuelan oil to China in the
opposite direction. Finally, China may be only interested in Venezuela in
the short run, as Beijing is busy exploring for oil and gas closer to its
shores in the South China Sea.
Despite these practical problems, Chavez’s rhetoric suggests the Venezuelan
leader earnestly seeks to challenge U.S. regional hegemony by putting
together a formidable coalition of like-minded nations. In a recent
interview on al-Jazeera, Chavez cited Venezuela’s energy alliance
with Cuba as an example of how "we use oil in our war against neoliberalism.”
What is more, when he was recently in Buenos Aires, Chavez launched the
first gas station run by a joint venture between Pdvsa and the Argentine
company Enarsa. The venture involves production, refining and distribution
of petroleum by-products and natural gas. Chavez has also concluded oil
agreements with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay. His desire to create a South
American energy company called Petrosur, which would integrate regional oil
and gas industries, is already bearing fruit.
Any interruption in Venezuelan oil exports to the U.S. would bring
significant disruption to both countries and Washington is beginning to plan
for such a contingency. Oil accounts for half of Caracas’ revenue and 75
percent of its exports. Currently the U.S. purchases 60 percent of
Venezuela's oil exports and according to analysts, finding new markets could
prove daunting to Venezuelan authorities. The fact is, exporting to the U.S.
market is convenient due to close proximity and low transportation costs.
Additionally, U.S. refineries are particularly equipped to process
Venezuela's sulphur-rich crude.
U.S. analysts doubt that Chavez can afford to drastically cut shipments to
the United States. And if Chavez cut off oil supplies, argue government
officials, the United States would quickly make up for the loss by seeking
other sources. But a potential cut off would represent no small economic
loss to the U.S., as oil imported from elsewhere would likely be more
expensive. The reality is that for the U.S., purchasing Venezuelan crude is
economically advantageous because the South American nation is
geographically close to U.S. ports. In Washington, politicians are now
hedging their bets. In a clear sign of concern, Republican Senator Richard
G. Lugar has asked the Government Accountability Office to study how a sharp
decrease in Venezuelan oil imports could affect the U.S. economy.
Additionally, the Senate recently called for a review of the government’s
plans "to make sure that all contingencies are in place to mitigate the
effects of a significant shortfall of Venezuelan oil production, as this
could have serious consequences for our nation's security and for the
consumer at the pump."
Even before Chavez was first elected he was explicit in describing his views
about petroleum. "Oil is a geopolitical weapon," he declared, "and these
imbeciles who govern us don't realize the power they have, as an
oil-producing country." The evidence suggests that Chavez is now trying his
best to follow through on this rhetoric.
This analysis
was prepared by COHA Senior Research Fellow, Nikolas Kozloff, D.Phil.
March 28, 2005
The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an
independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information
organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being “one of the
nation’s most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers.” For more
information, please see our web page at
www.coha.org; or contact our Washington offices by phone (202)
223-4975, fax (202) 223-4979, or email
coha@coha.org.
|