Guest Column
The PRI Makes a Comeback in
By George Grayson
Foreign Policy Research Institute
July 9, 2009
The once-dominant Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
staged a thundering comeback in
Mexico's July 5
congressional and state
elections and appears poised to
dominate
the next Chamber of Deputies in league
with
Mexico's Greens (PVEM). In the heated race for the
Chamber
of Deputies, the self-proclaimed
"revolutionary party"
garnered 36.7 percent of the
ballots cast compared with 28
percent for President
Felipe Calderon's center-right
National Action
Party (PAN), 12.2 percent for the leftist-
nationalist Democratic
Revolutionary Party (PRD), 7 percent
for the PVEM, and just
over 10 percent for a farrago of
small parties.
The PRI also captured five of the
six
gubernatorial races, including the PAN
strongholds of
Queretaro and San Luis Potosi.
The fractured
Left did well only in
PRD and the Workers' Party won 12 of 16 borough presidencies
and 28 of 40 directly elected seats in the
Legislative
Assembly, the
Of
participated, although
an unprecedented number of citizens
voided their ballots to
punish a political system that is
blatantly unresponsive to them.
This essay analyzes (1) factors in PRI's success, (2)
the
lack of accountability in Mexico's political system, (3) the
significance of Sunday's voting on the 2012
presidential
showdown, (4) the impact of the elections
on the nation's
drug war, and (5) the prospects for
Calderon during the
remainder of his term.
PRI's
COMEBACK
In the spring of 2009, the PRI watched its double-digit lead
shrink until pre-election polls showed that it registered
only 39 percent support vis-a-vis the PAN (34 percent) and
the leftist-nationalist PRD (10-11 percent).
Moreover,
momentum seemed to be with the PAN.
On Election
Day, the PRI, which governed the country from
1929
until 2000 in Tammany Hall
fashion, outpolled
Calderon's party by 8.7 percent and
captured 237 deputies,
according to preliminary figures
provided by the Federal
Electoral Institute (IFE). If
the PRI maintains the support
of its corrupt alliance partner, the
Greens, which picked up
21 seats, the PRI and the Greens will
control the 2009-2012
Chamber of Deputies, which convenes on
September 1. PRI
veterans should be able to find
ways to crystallize a pact
with the Greens, which is more
a family business than a
political organization. The
PAN (52 seats) continues to
enjoy an advantage
over the PRI (32), the PRD (26), the PVEM
(6), and small parties
(12) in the 128-member Senate, none
of whose members were elected on July
5.
Several factors gave rise to this stunning victory. To begin
with, PAN President German Martinez (who resigned the day
after the July 5 defeat) mounted a blistering,
no-holds-
barred attack on the PRI for its legacy of
mismanagement,
corruption, and involvement with drug cartels. Such
charges
fell on deaf ears to many young voters who do not
remember
the economic debacles of Luis Echeverria
(1970-76), Jose
Lopez Portillo (1976-82), and
Carlos Salinas (1988-94).
Martinez also had to contend
with "friendly fire" among PAN
activists in the gubernatorial
campaign in San Luis Potosi,
as well as an extremely
unpopular outgoing governor in
Queretaro who has
accumulated more frequent flier miles than
a UN secretary-general.
In the final analysis, a deep
recession
trumped all other considerations.
For its part, the
revolutionary party excoriated
for mudslinging
and offered fuzzy proposals encapsulated in
the innocuous slogan,
"Proven Experience--A New Attitude."
Meanwhile, PRI
president Beatriz Paredes Rangel; its
eighteen governors; and uber-Senator Manlio Fabio Beltrones
worked
tirelessly to grease and repair the creaky machinery
of the PRI,
which--unlike competitors--brandishes a presence
in the 31 states and the
Federal District.
Given the blows that Mexico
has suffered--a recession
inherited from the U.S.,
falling remittances from Mexicans
living abroad, the swine
flu epidemic, the collapse of the
tourist industry, sagging oil
prices, and at least a 5.5
percent decrease in GDP
in 2009--it is amazing that the
PAN's losses were not
greater.
In addition, Mexico State PRI Governor
Enrique Pena Nieto
launched his 2012 presidential campaign by
barnstorming on
behalf of PRI nominees. Not only
did he make personal
appearances, but he showered
resources and volunteers on his
party's candidates for governor
in Campeche, Colima, Nuevo
Leon, Queretaro, and San Luis
Potosi--all of whom won.
Differences between the Mexico
State chief executive and his
PRI counterpart in Sonora meant
that the "Golden Boy" (as
the movie-star handsome
Pena Nieto is known) did not
participate in
the gubernatorial donnybrook in that border
state. The PAN
eked out a victory, probably because of the
deaths of 48
children in the ABC day-care center a month
before the
voting.
Meanwhile, after former Mexico City Mayor
Andres Manuel
Lopez Obrador attracted nearly one-third of the
vote in the
controversial 2006 presidential showdown, the Mexico's
Left
has once again demonstrated skill in forming firing
squads
in a circle. The messianic Lopez Obrador has not
resigned
from the PRD; however, much to the chagrin of PRD
leaders,
he has accepted the presidential nomination of
two small,
opportunistic leftist groups: the Workers' Party
and the
Convergencia Party. In various areas, including the
Federal
District's largest borough of Iztapalapa,
Lopez Obrador
helped a Workers' Party
standard-bearer defeat his PRD
opponent. In view
of this disarray, many PRD voters opted
for the PRI, the
party from which many of them had migrated.
LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY
Analysts erred in predicting a low turnout inasmuch as 44.6
percent
of the 71.5 million eligible voters showed
up.
Denise Dresser, Sergio Aguayo,
and a host of other
intellectuals along
with civic organizations skillfully
employed the
Internet and the media to urge citizens to
spoil
their ballots to protest an unrepresentative
and
unaccountable political system. Their
movement yielded
dividends nationwide (5.6 percent)
and in a number of
jurisdictions: Mexico
City (10.8 percent), Chihuahua (7.5
percent), San
Luis Potosi (7.4 percent), Puebla (7.3
percent), and Michoacan (6.7 percent). Why
would more
several million people take the time to go to the polls
only
to desecrate their ballots?
The most compelling
explanation springs from the inability
of citizens to
influence elected officials. The chasm
between
the political elite and grassroots' constituents has
bred a sense of
political impotency.
For example,
chief executives, who reach office via a first-past-the
post
procedure. Calderon entered the presidency with 33.9 percent
of
the ballots cast, just 0.6 percent more
than Lopez
Obrador. If there had been a run-off to achieve a 50
percent
mandate, it might have forced parties to negotiate, bargain,
and compromise in pursuit of a successful coalition. Such an
alliance
could have contributed to collaboration in Congress
where intolerance
between and among parties thrives and
continually
impels deadlock and drift--except for bills
important to special interests.
Other measures that
amplify the establishment/grassroots
chasm are a prohibition
on independent candidacies; a ban on
civic groups airing media
ads during campaigns; the heavy-
handed hegemony of party
chiefs in selecting nominees and
ranking them on proportional
representation lists used to
select one-fourth the Senate
and two-fifths of the Chamber
of Deputies; disallowing
deputies, senators, governors,
state legislators, and mayors
from serving consecutive terms
in their offices;
and failing to forge a coherent,
responsible Left.
These considerations, combined with the
fact that so many
lawmakers lack defined
constituencies, militate against
advancing the interest
of average citizens. All the while,
elected officials line their
pockets with generous salaries,
hefty fringe benefits, Christmas bonuses,
travel funds, free
medical care, office expense accounts,
pensions, "leaving
office" stipends, and many other ways to live
the good life.
In response to legislation, the Federal Electoral
Institute,
which registers voters, supervises elections, and
reports
preliminary vote tallies, lavishes monies
on political
parties (3.6 billion pesos in 2009).
No
wonder that the late, inordinately
powerful PRI
"dinosaur" Carlos Hank Gonzalez coined the
lapidary phrase:
"Show me a politician who is poor and I will show you a
poor
politician."
The "voto nulo" sponsors plan to
organize its participants
in the weeks ahead via www.votosnulos.com.
THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Comics claimed that actress
Angelica Rivera, Pena Nieto's
significant other, spent July
6 at Los Pinos presidential
residence measuring for curtains.
A lot can happen in the
three years before Mexicans choose their
next president. Yet
surveys show the Mexico State Governor
as the frontrunner
among a dozen or more aspirants. As
mentioned, he is good-
looking, has access to all the
money he needs, and has
accumulated a suitcase full of
IOUs from politicians whom he
has helped.
In addition, Pena
Nieto comes from the country's largest
jurisdiction (10
million voters), boasts the near-unanimous
support of
the state's potent and affluent political
nomenklatura, gets along well with the business community,
enjoys abundant coverage on Televisa, the nation's largest
television network; and drubbed the PAN and PRD in his home
state
in the recent contest.
At the same time, he has spent billions of
dollars on highly
visible public-works projects that have won
approval from
mayors across the political spectrum.
His challenge
will be to avoid the internecine warfare that
found the
PRI's 2006 presidential candidate, Roberto
Madrazo, losing every state and finishing
third behind
Calderon and Lopez Obrador.
The "Big
Three" in the PRI are Pena Nieto,
age 43;
Beltrones, 54 (who functions as a virtual vice
president of
the country); and party chief Paredes, 53 (who may
head the
PRI faction in the next Chamber of Deputies). These
strong,
ambitious, and savvy leaders buried their
differences to
help impel Sunday's triumph. If
they can work together
during the next three years, the
PRI will remain the odds-on
favorite to recapture the presidency.
The PAN suffers from a "short bench." Other figures
may
arise, but in mid-2009 the
potential presidential
competitors were Interior Secretary
Fernando Gomez Mont, 46,
and former Education Secretary
Josefina Vazquez Mota, 48,
who could emerge as the leader of her
party's faction in the
Chamber of Deputies. The name of German Martinez,
32, graced
the list of "possibles" until the recent
electoral loss
forced his resignation as his party's head. Only if
there is
a strong economic rebound is the PAN likely to
retain its
lease on Los Pinos.
The fractured
Left may present two candidates. Lopez
Obrador, 55, continues to speak throughout
the nation
lambasting the PRI and the PAN, which
he ridicules as the
pro-capitalist, anti-poor "PRIAN." He is counting on
a total
collapse of the economy that will find los
jodidos (the
acutely disadvantaged) carrying him on
their shoulders to
the presidency.
Mexico City Mayor
Marcelo Ebrard, 49, also has his eye set
on the presidency.
While personally attractive and an able
speaker, he labors under
several burdens: bad blood with the
dominant, moderate "Chucho" faction
of his PRD; a reputation
for reneging on political promises;
unwillingness to break
openly with the mercurial
AMLO; rampant corruption
throughout the city's
bureaucracy; a prison system afflicted
by extreme overcrowding and
criminality; and the possibility
of being the candidate of the PRD,
which garnered only 12.2
percent of the vote earlier in the month.
THE WAR ON DRUGS
How will all of this play out
on the drug crisis now
plaguing both Mexico
and the U.S.? It should be recalled
that the
drug cartels got their start
under PRI
administrations as one more corrupt sector
among many. That
included the PEMEX oil monopoly and the electricity
duopoly.
It extended to the mass media,
public education, the
official union movement, the
peasantry, the judiciary, the
bureaucracy, and major tranches of the
private sector. Worst
of all, law-enforcement agencies were
also part of the
corruption.
Despite this
history, Martinez' attempt to tie the PRI to
organized crime
did not prove sufficiently persuasive to
overcome tough
economic conditions and the PRI's superior
organizational
elan. Moreover, prominent PAN politicians
have
cut their own deals with the narco-traffickers. For
example, a few days before the election,
a publicized
recording revealed that Mauricio Fernandez
Garza, the PAN's
(successful) mayoral candidate in San Pedro
Garza Garza,
Monterrey's immensely wealthy municipality,
had vetted his
anti-crime program with the sinister Beltran Leyva mob.
Yet the PRI has an auditorium-sized closet of skeletons. The
notorious paramilitary cartel Los Zetas operates a virtual
parallel government in the PRI-dominated northeast state of
Tamaulipas, whose last few governors left
office with
tarnished reputations. Mario Anguiano Moreno, the
victorious
PRI candidate for governorship of Colima--home of the
drug-
infested
narco-criminals. His brother
languishes in prison in the
The PRI's
Green comrades have successfully
used
environmental issues to attract young, suburban voters.
In
fact, the PVEM often aligns with the highest bidder. One of
its senators, Arturo Escobar y Vega, was arrested several
weeks before the election with a suitcase containing
1.1
million pesos. Authorities have not released the provenance
of these funds.
In general, the narco-syndicates
concentrated on local
elections, particularly along
trafficking corridors where
suborning or intimidating
mayors and their police forces is
crucial to their commerce.
Organized crime emerged from the
eletion stronger than ever.
In rural areas such states as
Colima, Durango, Guerrero Michoacan,
Sinaloa, Zacatecas, the
drug syndicates practice a form of
"dual sovereignty" with
elected governments--that is, the
cartels collect taxes
(extortion), create jobs (growing and
processing drugs), and
perform civic acts (contributing to churches and
schools).
IMPACT ON CALDERON
Calderon, 46, does not
want to follow in the footsteps of
his predecessor, fellow
PAN activist Vicente Fox Quesada
(2000-06), who
became a lame duck after voters thrashed the
PAN in the 2003
mid-term balloting. The PRI-PVEM bloc will
write the tight-as-a-tick 2010
budget, which sets priorities
for the nation.
Still, there
are several ways in which Calderon can remain
relevant, and
even effective. First, the president should
insist on a
strong person like former Jalisco governor
Francisco Ramirez Acuna or ex-senator and current Tourism
Secretary Rodolfo Elizondo to succeed German Martinez.
Second,
Calderon will continue to battle drug
cartels,
which--hundreds of arrests aside--remain brutally
powerful
and incredibly wealthy. The profound corruption of
police at all
levels will force him to continue to rely on
the armed forces.
Still, the Army has only 80,000 to 100,000
combat troops and, at
any given time, upwards of 5 to 10
percent are on leave,
sick, in training, or AWOL. Even as he
continues to apply muscle, the
president appears prepared to
concentrate more on electronic
eavesdropping, information-
sharing with U.S. agencies, spies on the
ground, scrutiny of
money flows, attention to
mayors and other political
"enablers" of the mafiosi,
and a wide array of technological
innovations.
Third, he
should consider appointing Arturo Sarukhan,
Mexico's adroit envoy to the United States, as
the new
foreign secretary. Incumbent Patricia Espinosa's
knee-jerk,
follow-the-leader approach to the complicated power shift in
Honduras argues for change in an area where
the chief
executive has substantial leeway. He
might also replace
other lackluster cabinet secretaries
(of Economy, Energy,
Agriculture, and Agrarian Reform).
Fourth, Calderon should seek PRI's backing (and even
the
PRD's support) in legally ousting common foes
who have
impeded the country's development--namely,
SNTE teachers'
union boss Elba Esther Gordillo,
whom the late Mexico
scholar M. Delal Baer
called "Jimmy Hoffa in a skirt"; and
Martin Esparza, potentate
of the obscenely corrupt and
featherbedded
Mexican Electricians Union (SME). SME's
employer, the state-operated Luz y Fuerza
also be eliminated, with another public company, the
Federal
Electricity Commission, taking over service in the
District
Finally, Calderon
should strive to convince the unreformed
PRI that--given
its promising chance of winning the
presidency in 2012--it should cooperate on a root-and-branch
tax
overhaul. Otherwise, Pena Nieto, Beltrones, Paredes, or
another
stalwart, if successful, will inherit a
failed
economy. Should he accomplish major changes in
the fiscal
system and/or break the SNTE, which has
colonized public
education, he will go down in history as a
successful chief
executive.
The
economic conditions in
trade, and
mounting narco-violence.
____________________________________________
George W. Grayson is the
Class of 1938 Professor of
Government at
the College of William & Mary, an associate
scholar at
FPRI and a senior associate at the Center for
Strategic
& International Studies. His next book,
Narco-Violence and a
this year by Transaction Publications.
Copyright
Foreign Policy
Research Institute
(http://www.fpri.org/)
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