Guest Column
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La Familia Michoacana:
Deadly Mexican Cartel Revisited
By George W. Grayson
August 5, 2009
At a May 30, 2009 news conference, Mexican Attorney General
Eduardo Mora-Medina Icaza labeled La Familia Michoacana (or
La Familia)
assessment on the bloodcurdling cruelty perpetrated by the
shadowy, pious organization; its ability to bribe and
threaten politicians; its spectacular surge in producing
methamphetamines; and its access to high-powered weapons in
Michoacan state, in southwestern Mexico, where 10,311 arms
were confiscated last year-more than in any other state in
the country.
Several factors explain why La Familia has shoved Michoacan
to the brink of becoming a no-man's land. First, the state
is home to Lazaro Cardenas, the seaport that, along with
nearby Manzanillo, Colima, provides the entry portal for
cocaine from Andean nations and precursor chemicals for
producing methamphetamines from China, Holland, Bulgaria,
and other countries.[1] Second, it forms part of the Tierra
Caliente, an avocado, mango, and marijuana growing region
where Michoacan, Guerrero, and Mexico State intersect.
Finally, it bristles with hidden super-laboratories for
manufacturing meth.
Michoacan has attracted not only La Familia, but other
potent, deadly crime syndicates: the Beltran Leyva brothers,
who cooperate with Los Zetas, a paramilitary force created
by the Gulf Cartel earlier in the decade; and the
Guadalajara and Milenio Cartels, elements of which
collaborate with the powerful Sinaloan Cartel headed by the
legendary Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera. As of July 31,
254 drug-related deaths had occurred in Michoacan-well ahead
of the 233 for 2008 and 238 for 2007.
Medina Mora's comments came only four days after federal
forces had arrested twenty-seven public officials, including
ten mayors in the Tierra Caliente, one of whom has American
citizenship. Although members of different political
parties, these office-holders purportedly had one thing in
common-links to La Familia.
In another bold move, President Felipe Calderon's government
also sought to apprehend Julio Cesar Godoy Toscano, an
alleged protector of La Familia in Lazaro Cardenas, Arteaga,
and Nueva Italia. Godoy Toscano is a deputy-elect to
Congress and the half-brother of Michoacan's governor,
Leonel Godoy Rangel.[2] Both men belong to the irreparably
fragmented leftist-nationalist Democratic Revolutionary
Party (PRD).
On July 10, elements of the Army and Federal Police captured
Arnoldo "La Minsa" Rueda Medina, known as the "coordinator
of coordinators" for La Familia. This informal title sprang
from his multiple responsibilities: (1) naming chiefs of
drug-trafficking and producing zones known as plazas in
Michoacan, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potos¡,
Colima, Jalisco, and parts of Guerrero and Mexico State; (2)
supervising deliveries of precursor chemicals for meth
production; (3) monitoring clandestine methamphetamine
laboratories; (4) charting routes for drug exports to the
U.S.; and (5) coordinating the search for and execution of
members of Los Zetas and the Beltran Leyva organization.
Reaction
In light of La Minsa's pivotal position, his comrades
immediately mounted a concerted and synchronized
counterattack that took the lives of the most federal
authorities in a single day since Calderon became president
in late 2006.
On July 11 La Familia ambushed units of the armed forces and
federal police in eight cities, beginning with Michoacan's
colonial capital,
confrontation erupted in Lazaro Cardenas, but La Familia
also used high-powered rifles and fragmentation grenades
against its foes in neighboring Guerrero and Guadalajara
states. On July 13 the cartel captured, stripped, bound, and
executed a dozen federal police, leaving their corpses in a
heap alongside the Morelia-Lazaro Cardenas highway with a
message reading: "Come for another [of our leaders], we are
waiting for you." ("Vengan por otro, los estamos
esperando"). On July 14 it ambushed a tourist bus carrying
thirty federal police near La Huacana on the same highway.
Later that day, it set fire to the federal police
headquarters in Zitacuaro.
All told, the mayhem killed at least seventeen federal
police and two soldiers, while wounding twenty or more
civilian and military agents of the federal government. Two
members of La Familia died in what some journalists
hyperbolically called Mexico's "Tet Offensive"-an early 1968
communist onslaught that failed militarily but convinced
opinion-leaders such as the late Walter Cronkite that
America could not win the Vietnam conflict.
Calderon dispatched 5,500 soldiers, sailors, marines, and
police, who erected checkpoints on major arteries and shored
up redoubts in La Familia strongholds. Local citizens
exhibited a mixed reaction to the influx of men hefting
automatic weapons and wearing ski masks. Gerardo Gomez, a
point where the local authorities are tapped out, and so
unfortunately it's necessary to call in extra forces to try
and restore peace."[3]
Meanwhile, Sonia Sanchez, a lime farmer in the town of
Buenavista, told a Washington Post correspondent that people
were "furious" over the apprehension of their mayor, Osvaldo
Esquivel Lucatero, a physician and soccer coach. Citizens
chained shut the doors of the municipal building, and
Governor Godoy, a PRD leader, groused about "the violent and
illegal incursion" by federal authorities. He decried the
failure of Calderon to consult with him before "occupying"
his state. His colleagues in the nation's Senate chimed in:
"We oppose the weakening of the Michoacan government that
the people elected at the polls," stated Silvano Aureoles
Conejo, vice-coordinator of the PRD's senators.
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which scored a
thumping victory in the July 5 congressional contests, even
questioned the effectiveness of troop movements under
Calderon. State party president Mauricio Montaya Manzo
lambasted the detentions, seizures, and arrests carried out
by elements of the federal government over the previous two-
and-a-half years.[4]
Interior Secretary Fernando Gomez-Mont brushed aside this
bellyaching, emphasizing that the gravity of the situation
required "an immediate, frontal, and determined
response."[5] Moreover, he made a direct challenge to La
Familia: "We are ready for you; deal with authority and not
with citizens; we are waiting; this is an invitation to
you." Deputies and senators across the spectrum decried this
bravado as provocative, which signaled Gomez-Mont's
frustration over the government's inability to quell drug-
incited ruthlessness with large military detachments. (He
subsequently apologized for his statement.) The units may
tamp down violence in one area only to face an upsurge
elsewhere in what one scholar called a "whack-a-mole"
dynamic.[6] Yet reliance on the Army and Navy is necessary
in light of the venality and unprofessionalism that infuses
the police departments.
Although "states' rights" is an issue in Mexico as in the
U.S., the grumbling from PRD and PRI spokesmen also
represents a concern that La Familia and other cartels have
suborned and intimidated political leaders from all parties
in the state. Moreover, corruption pervades the nation's 31
states and
worry that their jurisdictions may become the next target of
massive intervention by the federal government. Although
loyal to Calderon, senior military officers no longer hide
their frustration that venal politicians act with impunity
while soldiers suffer beheadings and NGOs excoriate the
military for human rights abuses.
Key Figures in La Familia
"La Minsa" Rueda Medina rose from car thief to becoming the
number-one hit man for La Empresa, a criminal organization
from which La Familia evolved. Formed in 2000, La Empresa
was headed by Carlos Rosales Mendoza (captured in 2004),
Jose de Jesus "El Chango" Mendez Vargas, and Nazario "El
Chayo" Moreno Gonzalez. Rosales Mendoza enjoyed a good
relationship with the boss of the Gulf Cartel, which was
headquartered below
He sought the Gulf Cartel's assistance in combating the
antagonistic Milenio and Guadalajara Cartels. In pursuit of
this goal, cadres of Los Zetas-then the paramilitary arm of
the Gulf Cartel-were dispatched to Michoacan. For several
years, La Empresa collaborated with the Army-trained
newcomers. Still, as Los Zetas began to distance themselves
from the Gulf Cartel--they now operate independently--they
pursued lucrative plazas in Michoacan.
This gambit incited a break with La Empresa, which morphed
into La Familia. Even though "El Chango" Mendez Vargas and
"El Chayo" Moreno Gonzalez became dyed-in-the-wool enemies
of Los Zetas, they adopted many of their sinister
techniques. These included hit-and-run ambushes of
adversaries; torturing and beheading foes to instill fear in
opponents in particular and in the population in general;
employing psychological warfare, unfurling banners in public
places and leaving threatening notes next to cadavers;
paying youngsters to serve as lookouts; and complementing
drug activities with extortion, human trafficking,
kidnappings, murder-for-hire, loan-sharking, and dominating
contraband sales by street vendors.
It was not just La Minsa's July 10 capture that infuriated
La Familia; authorities had also arrested his mentor Rafael
"El Cede" Cedeno Hernandez in late April. El Cede boasted
that he had recruited and trained 9,000 new members of the
organization in 2008. He also had responsibility for
thwarting Los Zetas' entry into Michoacan from Zihuatenejo,
Guerrero; overseeing the transport of drugs from Central
America; managing precursor imports; extracting payments
from bars and nightspots where high-school aged prostitutes
plied their trade; indoctrinating new members; and
organizing protests against the military's presence in the
state.
La Familia's banners warned that: "The people are tired of
this military invasion. We are living in a state of siege."
At the time of his capture, El Cede carried a credential
that identified him as a "permanent observer" of the State
Commission on Human Rights.[7]
After El Cede was taken into custody, his brother, Daniel
Cedeno Hernandez, stepped down as a federal deputy candidate
in the July 5 congressional election. He had been nominated
by the small Mexico Green Ecological Party, which is less a
political organization than an opportunistic, corrupt family
enterprise that allied with the PRI in the recent contests.
Still at large are such La Familia big shots as "El Nica"
Barrera Medrano, chief of the Uruapan plaza; "En Inge"
Mendez, head honcho in Turicato; "El T¡o" Loya Plancarte,
recruiter and public relations specialist for the group; and
"La Tuta" Gomez Mart¡nez, allegedly an ally of Toscano and
mastermind of the July 13 massacre of federal police.[8]
La Tuta has publicly stated that La Familia's quarrel is
with the federal police and SIEDO, Mexico's intelligence
agency, not with the Army, Navy, or president, a Michoacan
native it claims to admire. Gomez Martinez even proposed
negotiations with Calderon in order to hammer out a
"national pact"-an overture adamantly rebuffed by the
president. Rather than be lulled by such conciliatory
rhetoric, federal forces continued to hunt La Tuta, and on
July 29 captured Armando "El Licenciado" Quintero Guerra,
Gomez Martinez's presumed financial operator and coordinator
of La Familia's drug shipments to Tijuana and Mexicali. In
early August, the Federal Police snared Rafael "La Cuchara"
Hernandez Harrison, La Tuta's right-hand man in Lazaro
Cardenas. In addition, authorities seized Miguel _ngel "La
Troca" Beraza Villa, a key transporter of drugs to the
in a church in Apatingan on August 1-a move decried by the
Mexican Bishops' Conference.
Support
In contrast to Los Zetas and other Mexican capos, leaders of
La Familia exhibit a religious fervor that approaches
messianic zeal. The organization displayed this tendency in
its public debut in Uruapan on September 6, 2006, when they
lobbed five severed heads onto the dance floor of the Sol y
Sombra nightclub,[9] purportedly having concluded that the
five men were involved in the rape and murder of a
waitress/prostitute who worked in the bar and had been
impregnated by a member of La Familia. The death note
stated: "La Familia doesn't kill for money, doesn't kill
women, doesn't kill innocent people. It only kills those who
deserve to die." It claims to administer "divine justice" to
rapists, robbers, corrupters of youth, and the like. It has
even harshly disciplined teenaged graffiti artists.
Proceso magazine's Richard Ravelo asserts that the 4,000
members of La Familia were born and raised in Michoacan,
that they attend church regularly and distribute Bibles in
local government offices.[10] El Milenio newspaper reported
that La Familia uses the works of American evangelist John
Eldredge to instruct and motivate their recruits. Unlike La
Familia, Eldredge does not espouse violence. A graduate of
the
Ransomed Heart Ministries in
Eldredge has also written that: "Every man wants a battle to
fight, an adventure to live, and a beauty to rescue." The
message of his ministry is "to set men and women free to
live from the heart as God's intimate allies."[11] La
Familia boasts that it enjoys grassroots support because it
assists campesinos, constructs schools, donates books,
prevents the sale of adulterated wine, and employs
"extremely strong strategies" to bring order to the Tierra
Caliente.
La Familia acquires resources by extorting money from
merchants, loggers, hotel owners, local gangs, and small-
scale drug sellers, but maintains that it is simply
"protecting" its clients.[12] After vendors of pirated
diskettes in the Valle de Bravo, Mexico State, informed
authorities of La Familia's extortion, its hit men returned
to advise them of new fees for complaining to the police.
When arrested, the brigands told law enforcement agents: "We
are neither kidnappers nor gangsters (rateros). We come to
restore order and help those whom you cannot."[13]
Whether it's El Cede, La Minsa, or their successor, La
Familia stalwarts use evangelical appeals to recruit members
from the 700,000 Michoacanos (out of a population of 4.2
million) who live in hard-scrabble poverty. They concentrate
their message of rehabilitation, empowerment, and self-
renewal on drug addicts, alcoholics, and juvenile
delinquents. In order to forge a cult of true believers, the
syndicate castigates the use of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs.
In short, it provides a new family and sense of community
for the downtrodden and disenfranchised, whom they brainwash
into committing savagery to satisfy supposed commandments
from heaven. In return for their complete devotion, La
Familia pays its lookouts 2,500-3,000 pesos ($190-230) per
week.[14] These are princely salaries in a state where
unemployment soars and tourism has nosedived 40 percent this
year. Jose Luis Pineyro, an analyst who is close to the
Mexican armed forces, believes that joblessness and poverty
is creating "an army in reserve" for the traffickers.[15]
Disobeying La Familia's code of conduct yields a beating for
the first infraction, a more severe thrashing for the second
offense, and execution for the third violation. The
syndicate keeps careful records of members' families in
order to take reprisals against them if an operator deserts
or fails to carry out a mission. The organization's
perverted rules also decree that "whoever leaves La Familia
dies."
Political Influence
La Familia has extended its reach into
it controls or has conducted operations in numerous
municipalities. There as in Michoacan, it must compete with
Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Cartel, and the Beltran Leyva
brothers, who, in Mexico City's western suburb of
Huixquilucan, cooperate with the Colombian North Valley
Cartel. (The Beltran Leyvas employ Los Pelones to collect
payment from small drug dealers and have safe houses in
Huixquilucan, Naucalpan, and the Valle de Bravo.)[16] The
messianic merchants of death also operate in Jalisco,
Guanajuato, Nayarit, and
As indicated by the May 2009 arrests, La Familia Michoacana
concentrates on Michoacan politicians, especially local
officials who represent municipalities along their
trafficking routes. A protected witness avers that in the
last election the criminal band contributed 2 million pesos
($155,000) to favored mayoral candidates who, if elected,
receive a stipend of 200,000 pesos per month. The same
source swore that Governor Godoy raked in $300,000 from each
of La Familia's leaders-with his then-secretary of public
security serving as the conduit between the politicians and
criminals.[17] The Attorney General's Office denies that
Godoy linked to these mafiosi. However, Godoy's hunted half-
brother has prematurely sought to be sworn in as a federal
deputy to immunize himself from arrest.
These expenditures on campaigns represent a drop in the
bucket compared with La Familia's earning from
methamphetamine alone. According to a laboratory operator,
the organization invests approximately 1 million pesos
($77,000) in a plant to produce 100 kg of ice weekly, which
can generate earnings of 3.5 million pesos ($270,000).[18]
Federal forces have demolished forty labs this year; they
may represent the tip of the iceberg.
Abundant resources have enabled La Familia to establish what
the late historian Crane Brinton described as "dual
sovereignty."[19] In the case of Michoacan, this means that
parallel to the elected government stands a narco-
administration that generates employment (in growing and
processing drugs), keeps order (repressing rival cartels),
performs civic function (repairing churches), and collects
taxes (extorting businesspersons). Moreover, the Mexican
Constitution prevents mayors, state legislators, governors,
and other officials from seeking reelection; no such
provision applies to underground leaders, but bullets from
opponents rather than ballots may abbreviate their terms.
Significance for Mexican-U.S. Relations
While it used to be satisfied with doing business in
La Familia is moving aggressively into the
Reportedly, it has struck deals to pass through the
Northwestern region dominated by "El Chapo"'s Sinaloa Cartel
and the divided, much weaker Arellano Felix Organization.
Their trailers, replete with hidden compartments tucked
under fruits and vegetables, enter the
Mexicali, Tijuana, or Tamaulipas and head for Atlanta,
Dallas, or Los Angeles. The presence of 3.5 million
Michoacan natives north of the Rio Grande enhances the
traffickers' ability to sell their product in these cities,
as well as use these metropolitan areas as hubs from which
to supply smaller communities. DEA officials indicate they
are beginning to receive inquiries from law-enforcement
agencies on both coasts about "La Familia," a cartel with
which the local police have little or no experience.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that forceful military intervention is
still necessary, but a compelling argument can be made for
undertaking complementary efforts against La Familia and
other syndicates, by: (1) continuing the focus on
politicians and businessmen in league with gangsters; (2)
improving the gathering and analysis of intelligence, as
well as infiltrating cartels; (3) requiring integration and
coordination from intelligence-gathering organizations; (4)
assigning and training skilled intelligence personnel to
work with international agencies monitoring the flow of
drugs in the global markets; (5) strengthening support for
judicial reform initiatives; (6) devising more secure
programs to encourage and protect informants; (7)
identifying hotspots of drug movement, especially in the
ports, airports, and train terminals that are currently open
sieves; (8) developing an air radar network that can cover
the country for more than three hours a day, as was the case
in mid-2009, (9) developing more systematic forensic
accounting systems to reduce the flow of laundered funds;
and (10) taking full advantage of the new law that
authorizes the seizure of the assets of criminals and their
accomplices.
It is easier to advance proposals than to implement them.
Nonetheless, President Calderon must either make more
headway with his muscular approach or modify this
interdiction strategy during his remaining three years in
office. Results of the July election and opinion surveys
indicate that the once-hegemonic PRI stands a good chance to
regain the presidency in 2012. It is doubtful that the self-
proclaimed "revolutionary party," which worked hand-in-glove
with the traditional crime syndicates for decades, will show
the same commitment as Calderon to battling the vicious
malefactors. His moving against corrupt governors and other
politicians would not only win the approval of the military,
it would give him leverage in dealing with the PRI in
Congress and demonstrate that the enablers of drug-
traffickers will no longer remain above the law.
----------------------------------------------------------
Notes
[1] Inasmuch as
Pseudoephedrine in 2008, La Familia has begun purchasing
AFA, a drug that can be converted into methamphetamine.
[2] "Entregan constancia de mayoria a hermanos de Godoy," El
Universal, July 24, 2009.
[3] Quoted in Alberto Fajardo, "Mexican Troops Fan out
Across State Hit by Drug War," Banderas News, July 24, 2009.
[4] Quoted in Azucena Silva, "PRI critica aumento de fuerzas
federales," El Universal, July 21, 2009.
[5] Quoted in Jorge Ramos, "'Legitima defensa,' despliegue
en Michoacan: Gobernaci¢n," El Universal, July 19, 2009.
[6] Quoted in Hal Brands,
Counterdrug Policy (
Institute, 2009): 34.
[7] "Exigio Rafael Cede¤o en febrero de 2008 el regreso de
soldados a sus carteles, El Norte, April 21, 2009.
[8] Francisco G¢mez, "'La Familia' creci¢ por el cobijo
oficial: testigo," El Universal, June 22, 2009.
[9] See George W. Grayson, "La Familia: Another Deadly
Mexican Syndicate," FPRI Enote, Jan. 2009,
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200901.grayson.lafamilia.html
[10] "La familia: Society's Saviours or Sociopaths."
[11] Ransomed Heart Ministries, "Ransomed Heart is a small
ministry devoted to a big message,"
www.ransomedheart.com/ministry/who-we-are.aspx.
[12] "
networkedintelligence.wordpress.com/tag./la-familia/.
[13] "Paga o muere: tradicion de 'La Familia'," El
Universal, February 22, 2009.
[14] "Teme 'La Familia' despliegue en Michoacan," Excelsior,
June 22, 2009.
[15] Quoted in William Booth and Steve Fainaru, "New
Strategy Urged in
[16] "Disputan 4 carteles el estado de M‚xico," Reforma,
November 14, 2008.
[17] "Dicen que 'La Familia' apoy¢ campa¤as," Reforma, June
20, 2009.
[18] Francisco G¢mez, '"La Familia' extiende sus redes hasta
Europa y Asia," El Universal, July 26, 2009.
[19] Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Random
House, 1938).
_____________________________________________ - George W. Grayson is the Class of
1938 Professor of
Government at the
scholar at FPRI, and a senior associate at the Center for
Strategic & International Studies. His next book,
Narco-Violence and a
this year by Transaction Publications.
Previous essays by George Grayson can be found here:
http://www.fpri.org/byauthor.html#grayson
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