Guest Column
Social mobility and politics: Fear and hope in the lower middle class
- By Dan Lund
- Special to The Herald Mexico/El Universal
August 21, 2006
Election watchers are beginning to render a sketch of voter profiles, based on a limited number of exit polls and post-electoral surveys, and we are finding that voters’ identity goes beyond the blue and yellow map of regional divisions.
In general terms, we see that presidential candidates Felipe Calderón and Andrés Manuel López Obrador split the rural vote cleanly. In the upper segments of society, Calderón did very well, and in the heart of the working and urban marginalized classes, López Obrador did very well.
The surprise, however, is how they split the “social mobility” vote — the large segments of the lower middle class and the top of the working class. This group represented the classic vote of fear and hope, as well as the newly defined vote of independents.
But these segments and the actual voting pattern need more examination. It seemed that López Obrador had a strong position among these middle sector voters up through February of 2006. With the negative media campaigns, the situation became more fluid and eventually the two strong candidates divided this demographic sector, again in nearly equal terms.
Today, the how and why of that dynamic are perhaps the critically important features of the election.
SOCIAL MOBILITY
In a society of dramatic income disparity and visible social differences such as Mexico, the hope for social mobility is the glue that holds things together. Those at the top of the pyramid don’t want to lose their positions or privileges; they are concerned about social mobility if at all as a pragmatic or moral question for others in the society. Those at the bottom feel crushed, and often think of social mobility as a dream, or only a fantasy.
For those who are almost “there” or who feel like they or their children could get “there” (i.e. the middle class with its opportunities and privileges), social mobility is an organizing principle. It is a defining factor that plays into areas as different as living standards, lifestyle, education, career, residence, migration, emigration, savings, and political preference.
The lower middle class (called C- in market studies) and upper working class (known as D+ in market studies) produce the overwhelming number of newly defined “independents,” who played a critical role in preferences and preference shifts in the context of political campaigns and advertising.
We know from qualitative work, that these two groups are the most open to the dynamics of fear and hope as projected in campaigns. Sometimes, fear and hope are a nearly inseparable mix in perception.
Just how big are these segments in terms of population percentage?
Percentages of Segments National Chiapas A/B 3.80% 0.5% C 8.30% 2.6% C- 10.70% 1.9% D+ 26.30% 8.2% D 18.20% 37.8% E 32.70% 49.0% At the national level, the two critical groups constitute 37 percent of the population, and roughly the same percentage of the registered voters. However, the percentage is much less in parts of the south: In Chiapas they constitute just over 10 percent of the population and the registered voters.
The following set of hypotheses is being explored with colleagues:
• From 1975 to 1984, the interest was focused on the upward mobility of D+ to C-.
• In the next decade, from 1985 to 1994, there was a concern over mixed signals from the population data and specialized studies, and a consequent lively debate over the continuation of social mobility.
• Following the credit crisis impacting the middle classes in 1985 and general economic stagnation, the past decade has been characterized by a slow downward mobility of C- to D+ (the so-called “proletarianization” of the middle class).
• The C-/D+ grouping was the hardest hit by the financial and credit crises of 1994-5. From this period on, many people in these segments began to define themselves as independents. These groupings were no longer the backbone of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) for the Congressional elections of 1997, where the traditional dominant party lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies — the beginning of perhaps the most significant permanent shift in voting tendencies in the transition.
• The C-/D+ grouping was galvanized with hope and a sense of social opportunity in 2000, and was fundamental to the Fox victory at 43 percent of the total vote.
• In the Congressional elections of 2003, unconvinced by Fox, many of these voters returned to the PRI and were attracted to the PRD. However, the number of independents continued to grow within these segments.
• The C-/D+ grouping was split nearly down the middle for Calderón and for López Obrador in 2006. The PAN could not hold their strong presence there, either by fear or hope, as Calderón came in 7 percent below Fox. Not surprisingly, the segment did not return to the PRI. Somewhat surprisingly, the PRD made significant advances with these segments (though López Obrador was stronger among the C-/D+ categories before the negative campaigns of March and April, 2006).
Who are these folks most concerned with social mobility?
The C- market category or lower middle class, includes many families who have secured new credits in the recent period, for consumption, for a car and for a house. They are hopeful about staying in the middle class but fearful of falling.
They have complete or partial university degrees; some have completed high school. Their children are in private schools in some instances, often in public schools. The educational goals they have for their children are clearly focused on supporting them through a university education.
They are salaried specialized workers, lower to mid-level managers in the public and private sectors. They own and operate small and medium businesses, or are independent professionals in private practice, or working for the public sector. They make from US$10,251 pesos to US$20,000 pesos per month in combined household incomes, from both formal and informal income.
The D+ market category or top of the working class, includes many families who have experienced some downward mobility in the past decade, as well as others who have held on to favored working class incomes and hope for upward mobility.
They have partial high school or complete secondary school degrees. Some of their children are in private schools, but most often in public schools. The educational goals they have for their children are clearly focused on supporting them through a complete high school and hopefully a university, technical, or para-professional education.
They are salaried unionized workers, employees of “confidence,” including drivers, assistants, administrative secretaries, teachers, self-employed transport operators, fixed site merchants, mobile special services such as plumbers and carpenters. They own and operate micro businesses, and make from US$6,500 pesos to US$10,250 pesos per month in combined household incomes, from both formal and informal income.
- Compared to other segments, these two social classes watch more television, have contracted more debt, are more likely to have broken with the traditional political preferences of their families, and worry more over tangible social mobility. They are highly urbanized and even more highly plural in terms of politics, religion and values. They appear to be no party’s “natural base” and probably crystallize the textured but uncertain future of Mexico.
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- Dan Lund is the President of MUND Américas, a market and public policy research firm in Mexico, mund@mundamericas.com.
- Miami Herald Mexico Edition/Universal article at: http://www2.eluniversal.com.mx/pls/impreso/noticia.html?id_nota=34033&tabla=articulos
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